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Abstract—This paper explores verification of constituent sys-
tems within the context of the Symphony tool platform for Systems
of Systems (SoS). Our SoS modelling language, CML, supports
various contractual specification elements, such as state invariants
and operation preconditions, which can be used to specify
contractual obligations on the constituent systems of a SoS. To
support verification of these obligations we have developed a proof
obligation generator and theorem prover plugin for Symphony.
The latter uses the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover to automatically
discharge the proof obligations arising from a CML model. Our
hope is that the resulting proofs can then be used to formally
verify the conformance of each constituent system, which is turn
would result in a dependable SoS.
I. INTRODUCTION
A System of Systems (SoS) [1] is a collection of seman-
tically heterogeneous, independent, and distributed constituent
systems (CSs) which are co-ordinated to achieve an overall
goal. Independence means that no CS can exert control on
another CS, only influence its behaviour by offering potential
opportunities should synergy be reached. Since CSs are dy-
namic and heterogeneous, often changing their capabilities and
services, such synergy is achieved by negotiation of contracts
between a set of CSs, which impose binding conditions on
the behaviour of each CS. Since failure of such an agreement
will result in degradation of the SoS, it is important that each
CS has some measure of certainty in its ability to fulfil its
requirements, which in turn will lead to a dependable SoS.
System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) therefore requires
languages with which we can accurately model CSs to predict
their behaviour, and tools which enable their verification.
Such languages should have a sound theoretical background
to ensure that they can be assigned a consistent behaviour,
and the ability to handle the composition of heterogeneous
constituents. To this end the COMPASS Modelling Language
(CML) [2] has been developed, a formal modelling language
for SoSs. CML reproduces the style of the VDM-SL [3] formal
specification language, whilst integrating CSP [4] process
modelling constructs from the Circus [5] language. CML has a
formal semantics based in Hoare and He’s Unifying Theories
of Programming (UTP) [6], in its denotational, operational, and
axiomatic flavours. Along with the associated Symphony1 tool
platform, CML allows SoSs and CSs to be formally modelled,
tested, and verified in a controlled environment.
This paper focuses on two closely related components
of Symphony, the Theorem Prover Plugin (TPP) and Proof
1Symphony can be downloaded from http://symphonytool.org/
Obligation Generator (POG). A theorem prover can be applied
to verify a software system, that is mathematically demonstrate
that required properties are met through mechanically verified
proof. In the case of CSs, we need to verify that the internal
functionality and pattern of interaction is guaranteed to fulfil
the contract. In Symphony this verification can be facilitated
through the POG which generates proof goals upon which the
correctness of the CS model depends. CML has a number of
facilities for specifying contractual obligations, such as type
invariants, pre- and post-conditions for functions and opera-
tions, and system state invariants. These can then variously be
used to specify contractual obligations for a CS model, and the
application of the POG in concert with the TPP can be used to
verify that the system satisfies those obligations. Our thesis is,
therefore, that these technologies provide a way forward for
mechanically verifying that a CS model fulfils its contractual
obligations to the wider SoS.
In the remainder we outline our contributions. Section II
gives more background to our baseline technology. Section III
discusses related work. Section IV discusses the combined
POG and TPP framework, and how it can be used to verify a
CS model. Section V demonstrates an example CS, and how
we envisage verifying it for a wider SoS. Finally in Section VI
we conclude and outline future work.
II. BACKGROUND
CML is a language for modelling constituent systems and
their composition in an SoS. Systems are modelled using
CML processes, which are stateful reactive entities that can be
executed concurrently, and exchange messages over channels
in the style of the CSP process calculus [4]. A CML model
consists of a collection of user defined types, functions, chan-
nels, and processes. A process, in turn, consists of private state
variables, operations that act on these variables, and actions
that specify reactive behaviour using operators from CSP. CML
processes can be parallel composed to represent concurrent
execution, enabling description of a complete SoS.
CML has a formal mathematical foundation [7] based in
the UTP semantic framework [6], which allows processes
to be given a precise semantics. UTP allows us to tackle
semantic heterogeneity in SoSE by decomposing a modelling
language semantics into its theoretical building blocks, such as
state, concurrency, discrete time, and mobility, which can then
be formalised as “UTP theories”. UTP theories then act as
components with which we can construct semantic models for
languages and provide links between similar languages based


















Fig. 1: Semantically supported Symphony tool platform
Development of CML models is aided through the as-
sociated Symphony tool platform. Symphony is an Eclipse-
based development environment that provides a parser, syn-
tax highlighting, a type checker, simulator, model checker,
and a variety of other tools for variously constructing and
verifying CML models. Though consisting of independently
developed components, the different tools share a common
semantic foundation given by the UTP denotational model.
This “semantic stack” is shown in Figure 1, with the Symphony
platform and associated components positioned on top. Within
the UTP relational calculus several computational paradigms
have been formalised as UTP theories (Contracts, Processes,
etc.), and these have been in turn composed to produce
the CML denotational semantics. Finally, reference semantics
have been produced that underlie the various tools, including
the operational semantics, which underlies the simulator and
model checker, and various axiomatic semantics, such as a
Hoare calculus [8]. Since this formal link exists from each
tool down into the unified semantic basis we can have a
degree of certainty that the various evidences produced can
be consistently composed to verify a CS model.
To support such verifications we have created a theo-
rem prover plugin, based on the Isabelle/HOL [9] interac-
tive theorem prover. Isabelle/HOL is ideal for this kind of
verification since proofs can be independently checked with
respect to a secure axiomatic core; a facet of the “LCF
architecture”. Our theorem prover is based in a mechanised
semantic framework for UTP called Isabelle/UTP [10] that
provides a strong theoretical grounding for CML, ensuring its
consistency. We have mechanised a partial semantic model
for CML in Isabelle/UTP, a collection of associated proof
tactics, and a visitor that translates the CML Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST) into Isabelle definitions that can then be used to
support proof. Our current approach to proof in CML is to,
where possible, convert CML to equivalent HOL formulae, and
perform the proof using Isabelle’s variety of existing tactics
and laws, effectively transferring results from HOL to UTP.
In line with the UTP framework, the theorem prover is fully
extensible: we can add support for additional programming
concepts, and associated tactics as required in the future.
Alongside the theorem prover, Symphony contains a POG
that generates, for a given CML document, a collection of
proof goals that must be satisfied to prove certain high level
properties of the model, such as internal consistency, contrac-
tual correctness of operations, and termination. The TPP can
then be used to attempt discharge of these proof obligations,
resulting in concrete proof objects for the properties. We are
currently working towards a formal axiomatic semantics for
these proof obligations based on the current implementation,
which will allow the integration of these proof objects with
other evidences in the tool-chain.
III. RELATED WORK
The Symphony tool platform is an extension of the open
source Overture IDE [11] for VDM based modelling. The
Symphony POG is an adaptation of the POG for Overture [12]
to also handle CML proof obligations. Previous efforts to
generate and discharge Proof Obligations (POs) for VDM
include [13] and [14], which connect VDMTools and Overture
POs respectively to the HOL4 theorem prover [15]. These at-
tempts were limited to the functional subset of VDM. We use a
similar mapping for CML types and expressions, whilst adding
support for CML’s imperative and concurrent constructs.
The area of theorem proving tools includes a number of
options including Isabelle/HOL [9] (which we use); PVS2
combining a specification language with a theorem prover;
Coq [16], a proof assistant based on intuitionistic logic;
specialised verification systems such as Spec], which is based
on the Boogie verification language [17] and supported by the
Z3 SMT solver [18]; and the Rodin3 tool for Event-B which
includes an automated theorem prover.
We choose Isabelle for several reasons. It is based on
Higher Order Logic which is ideal for embedding a language
like CML. The LCF architecture ensures proofs are correct
with respect to a secure logical core. It has a large library
of mathematical structures related to program verification,
such as relational calculus and lattice theory. It integrates
powerful proof facilities, such as the auto tactic for automated
deduction, integration of first-order automated theorem provers
(like Z3) in the sledgehammer tool [19], and counterexample
generators like nitpick. We can directly harness many of these
proof facilities by our transfer based proof tactics. Finally,
Isabelle has been integrated into Eclipse in the form of
Isabelle/Eclipse4, an IDE which we reuse in Symphony.
IV. PO GENERATION AND DISCHARGE IN SYMPHONY
The Symphony POG is an extension of the Overture
POG for the Vienna Development Method (VDM) [12], and
therefore many proof goals generated are derived from VDM.
However, the POG has been developed with an extensible
visitor [20] based architecture that will enable the addition of
further goals as they are researched. The current proof goals
fall broadly into the following categories: safe usage of partial
operators; safe usage of functions with pre-conditions; type
compatibility due to union types, type invariants and subtypes;
and satisfiability of implicitly defined functions and operations.
To illustrate the use of POs in Symphony, we present a
simple example based on a well known partial operator case:
division by zero. Consider the following CML function: 
division : int * int → real





Fig. 2: Failed PO discharge.
For this function, the POG generates an obligation stating that,
for all inputs to the function, the value of the divisor (y) will
not be 0, thus ensuring the function executes successfully. This
is represented in the logical formula below: 
PO1: forall x:int, y:int & (y <> 0)
 
This states that for all variables x and y of type int, y is
not equal to 0. This is not satisfiable, and so an attempt to
discharge this PO will fail as shown in Figure 2. The function
must be enriched with a pre-condition, using the pre keyword,
in order for the discharge to be possible: 
division : int * int → real
division (x,y) == x / y
pre y <> 0
 
The additional information offered by the pre-condition alters
the PO and now the theorem prover plug-in is able to discharge
the revised PO as shown in Figure 3. It is of course not possible
to prove that an arbitrary integer is different from zero, but it
is trivial to prove that a non-zero integer is different from zero.
Fig. 3: Successful PO discharge.
The aforementioned example was trivial but, in general, it is
quite important to ensure that, when adding a pre-condition,
said pre-condition is sufficient to allow the discharge of any
POs generated for the function.
The addition of the pre-condition has another effect. One
must now ensure that, whenever the function is called its
pre-condition is respected. Therefore, a new kind of PO is
generated. Consider the following function and PO: 
divby2: int → real
divby2 (x) == division(x,2)
  
PO2: forall x : int & pre_division(x,2)
 
Since divby2 calls division, a PO is generated to
ensure that the pre-condition of division, given by
pre_division, is satisfied. This kind of obligation, called
pre-condition obligation is generated at all points
in the model where the function is called.
Fig. 4: Auto-generated theory files.
While the example shown was very simple, pre-conditions
(and invariants) can be as complex as necessary. They are
expressed in the functional subset CML and thus have the
full expressive power of CML’s first-order logic. In addition
to helping ensure consistency of the model, pre-conditions and
invariants are also used to specify additional properties
In fact, the methodology we propose is based precisely
on specifying desired properties and requirements of a model
through pre- and post-conditions as well as invariants. The
POs, once generated and discharged, stand as proof that the
model respects the specified properties.
Discharging POs is the task of the TPP. At its core, the
TPP consists of a mechanised semantic model for CML within
Isabelle/UTP. It is essentially a deep embedding of CML, in
that we give an explicit semantics to each of the operators of
CML processes within Isabelle.
The TPP will process a CML model and its associated POs
and automatically generate Isabelle theory files for them (see
Figure 4). These theory files can then be submitted to Isabelle
for discharging through various automated proof tactics such
as auto and sledgehammer, or the cml tac tactic that maps
a CML formula onto a HOL formula.
Because the TPP connects to the Isabelle/Eclipse plug-in,
the full functionality of that plug-in and, by extension, Isabelle
is available to the user . This includes the ability to write and
discharge model-specific conjectures directly in the Isabelle
encoding of the model. However, to perform this kind of work
requires significant knowledge of Isabelle and its syntax.
Therefore, the POG will be the primary source of goals
to discharge. Furthermore, the TPP offers a fully automated
mode of interaction with Isabelle where users simply choose
which PO to discharge and all inner workings (such as tactic
selection and result collection) are hidden from them.
We envisage two main functionalities for the plug-ins Quick
check and Proof Session. Quick check will be a fully automated
process, simply presenting a list of Proof Obligations (POs)
(including their predicates) in CML and linked to the relevant
model elements. The process of generating POs is quick,
therefore this may be performed frequently during initial model
development, to gain useful feedback about the model.
The Proof Session will be the main functionality of the
plug-ins. It creates a snapshot of the model (a timestamped,
read-only copy of the model’s CML sources), generates POs
and translates the model and POs into Isabelle theories. The
POs are displayed in a similar manner to the quick check
version but can now be submitted to the TPP for discharge.
At the moment only cml tac is available, though we hope to
enable automated use of additional tactics when attempting to
discharge POs. Regardless, the output of a proof attempt will
be captured from Isabelle and displayed to the user. Also, the
results of a proof session will be stored along with the model
snapshot, thus verifying the model’s correctness.
These two functionalities combine to form the following
work-flow: as a user works on a model, he can quick check for
POs as a way to gain early insights into the of the model. Each
PO can be seen of as a possible inconsistency and merely by
manual inspection they can guide the user in terms of adding
necessary pre-conditions or guards to the model.
Once a set of changes has been completed, the user
may use the proof session functionality to verify the model’s
correctness. Each set of POs and their associated proofs are
only valid for the particular version of the model they were
generated from so it makes little sense to attempt manual
proofs on a volatile model. Regardless of when it is attempted,
the proof session for the average user will be fully automated.
The user simply initiates a proof session and selects POs for
discharging either manually or in batch. Typically some POs
will be successfully discharged whereas others will fail to
discharge. These should indicate a problem with the model
and action must be taken by the user (for example, by adding
a guard or correcting program logic) to alter the model in a
way that allows the PO to be discharged. Then, the set of
completed PO goals can be used as a formal proof of the
constituent system’s correctness.
For advanced users who are comfortable interacting with
Isabelle/Eclipse directly, the full theorem proving perspective
gives them direct access to the tool so that manual proofs may
be attempted. Users can also specify and discharge additional
model-specific conjectures.
V. VERIFICATION OF EXAMPLE CONSTITUENT SYSTEM
We illustrate the use of the Symphony tool platform POG
and TPP with a simple example CS from a Railway Signal
System of Systems (SoS). The SoS in question aims to ensure
the safe and correct movement of trains on a section of
railway tack. Naturally such a SoS poses several dependability
concerns and the integrator of the SoS requires several safety
properties to hold throughout the life of each of the systems.
The Railway Signal SoS comprises several constituents
including a Route Rule Engine, several Track Actuators, Trains
and Dwarf Signal systems. In this paper, we look at one of the
constituent systems – the Dwarf Signal system – in detail and
consider the safety properties of that system.
From the perspective of the SoS integrator, there is a
requirement that the procured constituent systems provide a
safe service. The constituent system designer must, therefore,
provide evidence of this safety. Using model-based techniques,
we define a formal model of the Dwarf Signal – which may be
used as a contract to which the the signals must conform. The
Dwarf model used in this paper is based upon that introduced
in [21], and a typical signal may be seen in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: Picture of railway signal, with lamps indicated
The Dwarf Signal model is defined in CML with several
datatypes, functions, a single Dwarf process with state vari-
ables, operations and actions. The main datatype, DwarfType
shown below, has several fields relating to the transitions
which are to be made in the Dwarf Signal. For example,
the currentstate field dictates the collection of lamps
currently lit, and the desiredproperstate field repre-
sents the next state the Dwarf Signal should reach. The set of
possible signal states that may be reached is defined by the
ProperState datatype, which is constrained to be one of
for constant values: dark, stop, warning and drive
– each a set of lamps.
 
types
LampId = <L1> | <L2> | <L3>
Signal = set of LampId
ProperState = Signal
inv ps == ps in set {dark, stop, warning, drive}
DwarfType :: lastproperstate : ProperState
turnoff : set of LampId




inv d == NeverShowAll(d) and MaxOneLampChange(d)
and ForbidStopToDrive(d) and DarkOnlyToStop(d)
and DarkOnlyFromStop(d)
values
dark: Signal = {}
stop: Signal = {<L1>, <L2>}
warning: Signal = {<L1>, <L3>}
drive: Signal = {<L2>, <L3>}
 
There are several safety properties to which the Dwarf Signal
must adhere. These are defined in terms of functions referred
to in the DwarfType invariant – including, for example,
NeverShowAll which requires that the currentstate
should never have all three lamps lit. The Dwarf pro-
cess, outlined below has a single state variable: dw of type
DwarfType, and four operations: Init, which initialises
the dw state variable; SetNewProperState, allowing the
next desired properstate to be set; and two operations for
changing the lamps lit in the signal – TurnOn and TurnOff.
 




Init : () ==> ()
Init() == (...)
SetNewProperState: (ProperState) ==> ()
SetNewProperState(st) == (...)
TurnOn: (LampId) ==> ()
TurnOn(l) == (...)




Each operation is defined in more detail in terms of pre- and
post-conditions, dictating the conditions in which the operation
may be called and the guarantees it makes if those conditions
are met. The Init operation, defined in more detail below,
has a body which initialises the dw state variable, with a post-
condition requiring that various fields of the dw variable are
updated. The operation body – an assignment to the dw state
variable – must respect the safety properties of the Dwarf
Signal, in the form of the type invariant described above. 
Init : () ==> ()
Init() ==
dw := mk_DwarfType(stop, {}, {}, stop, stop, stop)
post dw.lastproperstate = stop and dw.turnoff = {}
and dw.turnon = {} and dw.laststate = stop
and dw.currentstate = stop
and dw.desiredproperstate = stop
 
The remainder of the CML operations are defined in a similar
manner – with pre- and post- conditions. In addition to these
operation definitions, the CML model contains actions which
dictate the ordering of internal events and operation calls. At
present, the POG does not handle these features of CML, and
thus they are omitted from this paper.
Executing the Symphony POG, we obtain several POs,
which are generated by the Init, SetNewProperState,
TurnOn and TurnOff operations. The POs fall into two
PO types: ensuring that the postcondition holds given the
body of the operation; and ensuring subtype consistency. It
is the second of these which ensures that the DwarfType
type invariant (and thus the safety properties of the Dwarf
Signal) holds when setting a new value of the dw variable.
The generated subtype POs (PO1 and PO2) and postcondition
PO (PO3) for the Init operation are shown below. 
PO1: inv_ProperState(stop)
PO2: ((inv_DwarfType(mk_DwarfType(stop, {}, {}, stop
, stop, stop)) and inv_ProperState(stop)) and
inv_ProperState(stop))
PO3: (((dw.lastproperstate) = stop) and (((dw.
turnoff) = {}) and (((dw.turnon) = {}) and (((dw
.laststate) = stop) and (((dw.currentstate) =
stop) and ((dw.desiredproperstate) = stop))))))
 
Using the Symphony tool platform, we generate these POs,
and attempt to discharge them. In Figure 6 below, we show
Symphony in the POG perspective with the POs represented
in the Isabelle syntax used by the TPP. In the figure, the list
of POs is given in the right hand pane, with a pane showing
the PO definition in CML below. In the figure, we see that
several of the POs have been discharged – these relate to the
Init operation above – as denoted by the green ticks.
Fig. 6: Progress on POs generated for Dwarf model
By discharging all POs for the Dwarf Signal model, we
provide a contractual model which is verified to be both
internally consistent and, through encoding the safety prop-
erties which must be met by a signal, is safe with respect
to the requirements placed on that contract. At present, whilst
those POs shown are successfully discharged by the Symphony
TPP, several are not. These relate to those POs which rely
upon the value of the Dwarf process state variable dw at
a given point of time. This may be either an issue with
the PO expressions themselves (where the VDM-based PO
expressions require further adaption to CML), or due to the
early stage of development of the TPP proof tactics. We discuss
these areas as future work in the next section.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have outlined two Symphony tool plat-
form plugins which enable automated proof support for CML
POs. The Symphony POG reuses and expands upon the Over-
ture POG, also resulting in improvements in the Overture Tool.
The TPP is the first attempt at tightly integrating a theorem
prover into the VDM family of tools, providing a more useful
tool for users wishing to discharge CML POs and general
theorems. We have also shown how both plug-ins can be used
in combination to formally verify the integrity of constituent
systems of an SoS specified with CML. There are clearly many
areas of future work, both short-term improvements to the
two plugins, and also longer-term directions and scoping of
the work in the fields of SoS and dependability-related issues.
Below, we discuss several such directions for further work.
This paper demonstrated the verification of constituent
system models. An interesting issue would be the verification
of an actual implementation, with respect to realistic system
properties. Whilst clearly not in the scope of this paper,
we would consider the work of this paper in context with
other system engineering activities. In particular; positioning
constituent system verification with respect to the work of
Holt et al [22] on SoS requirements engineering and the
specification of SysML contracts and translation to CML [23]
may provide the means to more realistic property verification.
The current CML TPP focuses on VDM-style proof obli-
gations which deal with issues such as subtyping and internal
consistency. In the future we will extend this with a more
comprehensive calculus, such as a Hoare logic [8] or a
weakest precondition calculus, which would both expand on
the existing proof obligations. This would also allow us to
reason directly about CML process and state behaviour, and
therefore provide fuller support for reasoning about contracts.
Another extension to the proof obligations relates to scaling
our approach from the level of constituent systems to the
SoS-level, thus ensuring that the verified constituent systems
interact in a manner that ensures the desired behaviour of the
overall SoS.
Just as pre-conditions and invariants can be used to specify
the properties that the POG and TPP verify, we need a
mechanism that allows these tools to reason about correctness
at the SoS level. We see two distinct possibilities here: the first
is to introduce a new CML construct that allows one to specify
invariants over the entire SoS, thus being able to “see” inside
all constituents. The second approach is to take the existing
POs that verifies a system and use them to also verify the
interface of a constituent. Afterwards, one must establish a
means by which these verified interfaces can be combined to
establish global SoS properties. Of the two approaches, the
second one seems closer to the spirit of SoS engineering, and
we believe CS refinement provides a way forward here.
We are also currently working on a tool for CS refinement,
which combines with the theorem prover and can be used to
formally demonstrate contractual satisfaction. This will reuse
the POG to enumerate and discharge refinement provisos
which must often be satisfied to ensure validity of a refinement
step. Refinement will be principally supported by Isabelle,
though we are also exploring the use of model generation
tools to aid automation. For example, the Maude rewriting
logic engine [24] has previously been applied to automated
refinement [25], which we hope to adapt for CML. Such
advances over the current technology are feasible because of
our extensible approach to semantics provided by UTP.
Finally, though both plug-ins presented here are still at
an early development stage, work is ongoing on various
improvements. While the TPP and its associated Isabelle the-
ories support a significant subset of CML (types, expressions,
functions, and operations), work is ongoing on increasing the
coverage of the plug-in. The proof tactics are also under further
development in order to discharge increasingly complex goals.
Moreover we wish to expose more of Isabelle’s native proof
facilities in the TPP, such as sledgehammer and nitpick, so
as to bring their full weight to bear in discharging or refuting
proof obligations. Parallel to this there is work to formalise
the proof obligations in Isabelle with respect to the CML
semantics. Finally, we hope to produce guidance to the user
of how to interpret failure when a PO cannot be discharged.
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